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Abstract
■ The role of motor experience in the processing of perceived
actions is hotly debated on both behavioral (e.g., action under-
standing) and neural (e.g., activation of the motor system)
levels of interpretation. Whereas some researchers focus on
the role of motor experience in the understanding of and motor
activity associated with perceived actions, others emphasize the
role of visual experience with the perceived actions. The ques-
tion of whether prior firsthand motor experience is critical to
motor system activation during perception of actions per-
formed by others is best addressed through studies with infants
who have a limited repertoire of motor actions. In this way,
infants can receive motor or visual training with novel actions
that are not mere recombinations of previously acquired actions.
In this study, 10-month-old infants received active training with
a motorically unfamiliar action that resulted in a distinct sound
effect. They received observational experience with a second,
similarly unfamiliar action. Following training, we assessed
infants’ neural motor activity via EEG while they listened to the
sounds associated with the actions relative to a novel sound. We
found a greater decrease in mu power to sounds associated with
the motorically learned action than to those associated with the
observed action that the infants had never produced. This effect
was directly related to individual differences in the degree of
motor learning via motor training. These findings indicate a
unique effect of active experience on neural correlates of action
perception. ■
INTRODUCTION
Links between action and perception have been estab-
lished across several species, throughout development,
and via a variety of measures. Across these findings, the
general notion is that action and perception of goal-
directed actions are connected via shared neural repre-
sentations and that this connection allows us to use our
action experience to recognize and predict the goals of
others’ actions (Prinz, 1997). The identifying feature of
these shared representations, the so-called mirror sys-
tem, is that similar brain regions or neurons (as mea-
sured via fMRI, EEG, single cell recording, or other
neuroimaging measures) are active when performing an
action and perceiving the same action (or the sound or
effect of that action; Kohler et al., 2002).
The Controversial Role of Expertise
in Mirror System Activation
To understand the intricate relation between perception
and action and differentiate the roles of motoric and
visual experience, researchers are investigating the links
between motor expertise, action perception, and activa-
tion of the motor system. One avenue of investigation
that aims to parse out unique effects of motor expe-
rience, exemplified by Casile and Giese (2006), is to
directly examine the role of motor experience on action
perception, independent of any visual experience. In this
experiment, participants were trained to perform a novel
movement while blindfolded. Their accuracy in iden-
tifying this movement via visually presented point light
displays improved after motor training despite a lack of
visual information during training. Interestingly, indi-
vidual differences in visual recognition performance
strongly correlated with participants’ accurate perfor-
mance of the newly learned action during blindfolded
training.
Similar effects of experience on brain activation over
motor regions further corroborate the behavioral effects
of motor training. For example, Calvo-Merino, Grèzes,
Glaser, Passingham, and Haggard (2006) measured brain
activation during the observation of dance moves pro-
fessional dancers had previously performed relative to
moves with which they had visual familiarity but no
motor experience (i.e., moves produced by a dance
partner of the opposite gender). They found increased
premotor, parietal, and cerebellar activity for those actions
within the dancers’ own motor repertoires relative to
the visually, but not motorically, familiar actions. Cross,
Hamilton, and Grafton (2006) further showed that trainingRadboud University Nijmegen
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dancers to perform novel dance moves increased pre-
motor activity when viewing the trained, but not un-
trained, actions. Similar effects of expertise on motor
activation and activation of larger mentalizing brain net-
works have been found for chopstick use ( Järveläinen,
Schuermann, & Hari, 2004), handwriting (Quandt, Marshall,
Bouquet, Young, & Shipley, 2011), sports (Kim et al., 2011;
Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008), andmusic (Bangert
et al., 2006).
In contrast to the evidenced differences between
motor experts and nonexperts in motor activation across
domains, other research indicates comparable or in-
creased motor activity to motorically unfamiliar actions.
For example, in a follow-up to the Cross et al. (2006)
study, the researchers compared physical and observa-
tional learning of dance moves and found increased activ-
ity in premotor and parietal regions for both types of
actions (relative to actions not performed/watched, Cross
et al., 2006; see also Cross et al., 2012; Cross, Kraemer,
Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009). Thus, the current
state of the adult literature on experience is inconclusive.
Development provides a unique window in which to look
at effects of experience on neural activation of the motor
system because infants have a more limited repertoire of
experience on which to draw. Furthermore, intervening
in early development allows one to manipulate the tim-
ing of naturally emerging motor actions and study the
direct effects of this manipulation.
A Developmental Perspective on Active Experience
Both behavioral and neuroimaging studies have been
conducted with infants in the first 2 years of life to exam-
ine the role of active experience on action perception. In
intervention studies, infants are trained to perform novel
actions, and their recognition of the goal of these actions
is then assessed. For instance, 3-month-old infants who
were trained to perform reaching actions (using Velcro
mittens), but not untrained infants, recognized the goal
of a reaching action (Sommerville, Woodward, &Needham,
2005). Importantly, several studies have now contrasted
active with observational experience. When 3-month-old
infants were given active versus observational training
with reaching actions, only those who received active
experience benefited from training (Gerson & Woodward,
2014a, 2014b). Similarly, 10-month-old infants benefited
from active, but not observational, training with cane-
pulling actions (similar to cloth-pulling; Sommerville,
Hildebrand, & Crane, 2008). Investigating the role of
motor, relative to visual, experience is crucial for under-
standing the role that the motor system plays in action
perception.
Other researchers have focused on neural measures to
assess effects of active experience on the motor regions
of the infant brain. The most common assessment of
motor activity in the infant brain is the measure of the
so-called “mu rhythm,” measured via EEG. In both infants
and adults, reduced power (relative to a baseline condition)
in the alpha frequency bands (approximately 8–12 Hz in
adults and 6–9 Hz in infants; Marshall, Bar-Haim, &
Fox, 2002) has been found over motor regions of the
brain (central and frontocentral electrodes) both when
individuals perform and observe goal-directed actions
(Cuevas, Cannon, Yoo, & Fox, 2014; Marshall & Meltzoff,
2012, 2014; Vanderwert, Fox, & Ferrari, 2013). Using this
measure, some studies reveal striking parallels to the neuro-
imaging research on expertise in adults and the behavioral
evidence in infancy. For example, Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk,
and Bekkering (2012) found motor activity in 8-month-olds
during perception of sounds associated with previously
learned actions but not sounds associated with objects on
which infants did not act during a training phase (see also
Lloyd-Fox, Wu, Richards, Elwell, & Johnson, 2013; van Elk,
van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 2008). This
research, however, examined actions with which infants
alreadyhad previous experience anddid not assesswhether
newly acquired actions led to similar effects in the motor
system.
Furthermore, as with adults, data concerning the role
of experience in infancy are not all consistent. In a recent
study by Southgate and Begus (2013), there was no dif-
ference between motor activation during the observation
of executable and nonexecutable actions (e.g., movement
of objects by a claw) in 9-month-olds. In a follow-up to the
Paulus study (Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013), infants
saw their parents shake a rattle that made a novel sound.
These infants later showed motor activity to the sounds
associated with the observed action. In this study, how-
ever, the observed action was one that infants were capa-
ble of producing before the training study. Thus, it is still
unknown whether such mapping via observation would
occur with motorically unfamiliar actions.
In summary, the question of whether active experience
is crucial to processes underlying action perception is still
open. In this experiment, we examine the possibility that
a close link between action production and perception
early in development can be built upon with greater
experience. According to this proposal, given that rattle
shaking in the Paulus et al. (2013) study was within the
motor repertoire of these infants, the subsequent motor
activation to the sound associated with the observed
shaking could be a function of the infant mirroring the
shaking action during training. Rather than relying on
assumptions of previous action experience, we created
new experiences with a novel action and assessed the
effects of this experience on neural responses to action
perception. To do so, we manipulated young infants’ ex-
perience with unfamiliar actions and measured the
effects of motor versus observational learning of novel ac-
tions on the motor system. This training manipulation
closely matches those used in behavioral research with
infants that have found unique effects of active, above and
beyond, observational experience (Gerson & Woodward,
2014a, 2014b; Sommerville et al., 2008). Incorporating an
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interventional training design with neural measures
allows us, for the first time, to examine causal claims
about the effects of active versus observational expe-
rience on action perception links on a neural level and
test the assumption that active experience is critical to
motor activity during action perception early in devel-
opment. We expected more motor activity to sounds
associated with actively learned actions than observed
actions that the infants had never produced (Hunnius
& Bekkering, 2014; Woodward & Gerson, 2014; Elsner
& Hommel, 2001). Furthermore, we hypothesized that
those infants who were better able to perform the
learned action at the end of training would have a more
precise motor representation of the action and thus
show greater motor activity to the sound associated
with the learned action.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six infants were scheduled based on previous
research, and 17 infants were included in the final sample
for this study. Nine infants began the study but were not
included in final analyses because of not returning for the
EEG session after training (n = 1) or not sitting through
at least nine trials of each condition before movement
and artifact rejection (n = 8). No infants were excluded
from final analyses because of outlying data points. As
suggested in recent reviews (Cuevas et al., 2014), we also
examined whether data were similar when we removed
outliers from analyses. After calculating the event-related
desynchronization (ERD; the relative decrease in power
to the event versus baseline, as described in the Results
section below), any infant who had an ERD greater than
three standard deviations above the mean at any site and
in any condition. This excluded four infants, and we saw
the same pattern of results (active ERD lower than ob-
servational ERD). The final data set of infants ranged in
age from 9 months 16 days to 10 months 16 days at
the pretraining session (mean age = 10 months, 0 days).
Research was approved by the local ethics board.
Materials and Procedure
Infants’ participation in this study consisted of three
phases: a pretraining behavioral session, behavioral train-
ing sessions at home, and a posttraining EEG session. In
each of these sessions, the same two toys were used
during the behavioral portion (see Figure 1). Both toys
afforded means-end actions that resulted in a unique
sound effect (a series of tones that lasted approximately
2 sec). One toy had a wooden puppet atop a rectangular
box (10.5 × 10.5 × 17 cm). When the box was hit with a
staff-like tool (approximately 34 cm long), the puppet
spun around and a sound was played. The second toy
was a rectangular box (31 × 25 × 11.5 cm) with an inden-
tation at the front. When a cane-like tool (approximately
40 cm) was used to pull a toy duck into the indentation, a
sound was played. The particular sound associated with
each toy was counterbalanced across infants. The toy on
which the infant performed versus observed an action
was also counterbalanced.
Pretraining Session
In the first session, infants observed the experimenter
perform the appropriate means-end action on one of
the two above-described toys (and heard the associated
sound). After the experimenter performed the action,
she asked the parent to perform the action and made
sure the parent was demonstrating the action in a similar
fashion (e.g., drawing the infant’s attention to the toy
during the action and during the playing of the sound,
if necessary). The infant was then taught to perform
the action on the other toy. The action was demonstrated
for the infant, and the infant was encouraged to attempt
the action himself or herself. If the infant did not act, the
experimenter encouraged the parent to help move the
child’s hand toward the tool and coach them through
the action in scaffolded steps. After training, the child
and the parent on each of the two actions, the experi-
menter gave the parent a schedule for training through-
out the following week. The experimenter also helped
Figure 1. (A) An infant learning
to perform a new action at
home: hitting a toy with a stick.
(B) An infant observing her dad
perform a new action at home:
pulling a duck with a cane.
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the parent learn how to use the camera that they would
take home to record home training sessions.
Training Sessions
Parents were asked to have their child perform the
trained action every alternate day for approximately
5 min each day between the pretraining and posttraining
sessions. On the alternate days, the parent demonstrated
the other action for the child. As during the pretraining
session, parents were told to draw their infant’s attention
to the action when observing and to help their child if
necessary when performing. Parents were asked to record
all sessions so that coding of activity could be assessed off-
line via digital video. Coding of these videos indicated that
parents typically practiced each action approximately
three times between the pretraining and posttraining
session (range = 3–5). The average length of each training
session was longer ( p = .02) for the active training ses-
sions (5:21 min) than for the observational training ses-
sions (4:15 min). Despite the difference in length,
infants viewed, on average, more successful actions per
session ( p < .001) during the observational training
sessions (M = 16.18) than the active training sessions
(M = 9.64).
Posttraining Session
Posttraining sessions occurred between 6 and 11 days
(mean intersession length was 7.41 days) following the
pretraining session. Infants were first familiarized with
the room and the experimenters and then fitted with a
32 active electrode infant-sized EEG cap (Brain Products,
Munich, Germany). Infants then sat on their parent’s lap
in a shielded room in front of a monitor that displayed
abstract pictures that were randomly changed every
1600 to 5000 msec ( jittered timing between picture pre-
sentation). Pictures were an attempt to maintain infants’
attention and were unrelated to the test stimuli. Audio
stimuli were played from a central speaker every 2600
to 5000 msec ( jittered presentation time and unrelated
to of the presentation of the pictures). Each audio stim-
ulus lasted 2000 msec and consisted of three different
sounds: the sound associated with the performed action
during training (which differed between infants because
of counterbalancing), the sound associated with the ob-
served action, and a novel sound. The order of sound
presentation was pseudorandomized, with the constraint
that each sound was always repeated twice (and never
more than twice in a row). Each sound was presented
20 times throughout the session. Following the picture
and sound presentation, infants had the opportunity to
perform each of the two actions (while EEG was record-
ed). Infants first performed the action they had practiced
at home and then the action they had only previously
observed.
Coding and Analysis
Coding and Exclusion of Movement
Each video was coded offline for infant movement. No
sound was played during coding so that the coder was
blind to the condition of trials that were identified as
consisting of movement. All movements were coded
and identified as gross movement (e.g., turning toward
the parent), fine movement (e.g., moving one finger),
or movement that resembled grasping. For final analyses,
all trials with movement were removed. On average, 37
of the 60 possible trials were removed per infant due
to movement (SD = 8.53, range = 22–50).
Coding of Actions
At the end of the EEG session, all infants had the chance
to perform each of the two actions. EEG collection was
continuous throughout this portion. Five randomly se-
lected segments of the EEG data collected during infants’
action performance (for each infant) were used to iden-
tify the frequency bands used in our analyses (see below).
We presented them with the object on which they had
received active training first and then presented them
with the object they had previously only observed. A
trained coder then assessed, for each infant, his or her
actions on each object. The videos were clipped and pre-
sented in random order so the coder was blind to the
infant’s experience with each object. The coder counted
the number of times each action was successfully pro-
duced and whether the child produced the action suc-
cessfully on his or her own or did so with the help of
the parent or experimenter. Infants were assigned a score
based on their actions on each object: Never Performed
Alone (if they only ever performed the action with help
or never performed the action at all) or Performed Alone
(if they ever performed the action without help from the
parent or experimenter). The scores were ordinal such
that any infant who both performed the action with a
parent and on their own was scored as Performed Alone.
For actions on the actively learned object, nine infants
were in the Never Performed Alone group and eight
infants were in the Performed Alone group. For actions
on the observed object, 11 infants were in the Never
Performed Alone group and 6 were in the Performed
Alone group.
EEG Analysis
Thirty-two active electrodes were arranged in the 10–20
system and referenced online to FCz. The signal was
amplified using a 32-channel BrainAmp DC EEG amplifier,
band-pass filtered (0.1–125 Hz), and digitized at 500 Hz.
We kept impedances below 60 kΩ. We analyzed the data
using FieldTrip, an open source Matlab (version 7.0,
TheMathWorks, Inc.) toolbox developed at the Donders
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Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour (www.ru.nl/
neuroimaging/fieldtrip). Trials were identified by the
onset of each sound and lasted for the length of the
sound (i.e., about 2 sec). Trials during which infant
movement was coded were excluded from further ana-
lyses. We then visually inspected the remaining trials to
exclude EEG artifacts such as noisy channels. On average,
approximately nine trials (range = 3–20) remained for
each condition for each participant after movement
and artifact rejection. The number of trials analyzed did
not differ between conditions. When including only
those infants who had six or more trials per condition
(approximately 100/170 data points), results remained
consistent (i.e., a significant effect of condition remained,
p = .05). A bandpass filter was used with a frequency
range of 1–30 Hz. A fast Fourier transform was then
conducted using a multitaper method with a Hanning
taper and a 2-Hz smoothing box to determine spectral
power estimates for each condition from 1 to 30 Hz.
RESULTS
To verify that the mu rhythm was in the 6–9 Hz range for
our sample (as suggested by previous research; Cuevas
et al., 2014; Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011), we compared
power values across the 3–30 Hz range during periods
of infant movement (i.e., when infants performed the
actions at the end of the EEG session) relative to periods
that were free of movement (i.e., collapsing across con-
ditions to include all trials of sound presentation that
were not removed because of movement). Mu rhythm
has been defined as the frequency bands that are sup-
pressed during movement relative to nonmovement
over motor regions. To account for variability in power
ranges across infants, a proportional score was used to
calculate relative power per band from 2 to 30 Hz: (power
in each 1 Hz band) / (average power across 2–30 Hz
bands). As expected, a decrease in power for the move-
ment, relative to the still, phases of the experiment in
the 6–9 Hz range, confirmed our choice of frequency
bands for analyses (see Figure 2).
ERD was defined as (event-related power − baseline
power) / (baseline power) with power during presenta-
tion of the novel sound serving as baseline (Vanderwert
et al., 2013; Pfurtscheller, 2003). On the basis of previous
research (Marshall & Meltzoff, 2012), mu power was
calculated as power in the 6–9 Hz frequency range over
frontocentral sites (C3, C4, Cz, FC1, and FC2). ERD was
calculated separately for time-locked to sounds asso-
ciated with performed actions and sounds associated
with observed actions. A generalized linear model (GLM)
with ERD as the dependent variable and Condition (per-
formed or observed), Region (C or FC), and Site (1/3
[i.e., FC1 or C3], 2/4 [i.e., FC2 or C4], z [i.e., Cz]) as within-
subject factors revealed a main effect of condition, F(1,
152) = 6.20, p= .014, ŋp
2 = .039, and no other main effects
or interactions. The difference between conditions was
a function of a lower ERD in the performed than the
observed condition.
Identical GLM analyses that replaced frontal, parietal, and
occipital regions with the central and frontocentral regions
in the above-described GLM (e.g., ERD as the dependent
variable, Condition [performed or observed] and Site [3,
4, z] as within-subject factors for frontal sites) revealed
no significant differences between conditions, ps > .30;
ŋp
2 ≤ .01, indicating that the effect was localized to fronto-
central sites (see Figure 3; note: when outliers were excluded
for these other regions, the results remained the same).
In an additional GLM (with Site and Region as within-
subject factors), raw power data (i.e., not ERD corrected
for baseline, so that activation to the novel sound, pre-
viously baseline, could be compared directly with activa-
tion to the other sounds) was compared between the
sound associated with the performed and observed
Figure 2. Relative power values as a function of frequency (Hz)
depicted for still periods (collapsed across conditions) and execution of
actions. The yellow shaded area illustrates the alpha-frequency range.
Figure 3. ERD (in frontocentral electrodes) to active and observational
sounds was not significantly different in frontal, parietal, or occipital
regions. ERD is defined as (event-related power − baseline power) /
(baseline power) with power (6–9 Hz) during presentation of the novel
sound serving as baseline (outliers excluded; error bars represent
standard errors).
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action versus the novel sound. A significant decrease in
power was found in response to the sound associated
with the actively trained action, F(1, 152) = 4.29, p =
.04, ŋp
2 = .027 (see Figure 4). There was no difference
in power between the observed versus novel sound,
p = .84, ŋp
2 < .001.
To examine individual differences in training effective-
ness, a final set of GLMs were conducted with condition
as a fixed factor and region and site as within-subject
factors, ERD to the active sound as dependent variable,
and ability to perform the learned action in the last ses-
sion (Performed Alone or Never Performed Alone) as a
between-subject factor. This revealed a significant inter-
action between condition and performance ability, F(1,
142) = 3.24, p = .034, ŋp
2 = .031 (see Figure 5), such that
infants who had performed the action alone showed a
significant difference in ERD to the sounds associated
with the actively learned versus observed actions (mean
difference = .64 [SEM = .19], p = .001), whereas infants
who never performed the action alone did not (mean
difference = .08 [SEM = .18], p = .68). Because, at the
end of the final session, infants also had the chance to
perform the action they had previously only observed,
we also measured differences in infants’ ability to per-
form this action at the end of training (though they only
received observational training with this action). When
the ability to perform the observed action was added as
a covariate to the above GLM, no such interaction
emerged, p = .06, ŋp
2 = .02. This suggests that variability
in learning the actively experienced action, but not
variability in learning a similarly difficult (but only pre-
viously observed) action, drove these effects.
Figure 4. Raw power to active
and observational sounds
collapsed across all participants
(A) and split by infants’ ability
to perform the actively learned
actions (B) (error bars
represent standard errors,
*p < .05).
Figure 5. ERD (in frontocentral
electrodes) plotted per
participant, split as a function
of infants’ ability to produce
the actively learned action at
the end of training. Means
across participants within
each group are plotted as
lines, and the shaded area
represents the standard error.
ERD is defined as (event-related
power − baseline power) /
(baseline power) with power
(6–9 Hz) during presentation
of the novel sound serving
as baseline.
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DISCUSSION
The results of the current study can be summarized in
two points: First, motor experience with novel actions
uniquely activates the neural motor system in response
to perceiving the effect of this action, whereas observa-
tional experience does not. Second, this effect is directly
related to individual differences in the degree of motor
learning during active training. These findings suggest
that active experience is critical to modulating motor
activity during action perception early in development.
These findings provide crucial information for the theo-
retical debates concerning the role of experience in
action perception and motor activation. The effects of
short-term training of novel motor actions on neural
responses to the sensory consequences of those actions
have never before been studied in infants. The training
paradigm demonstrates a direct, causal effect of active
experience on the neural correlates of action perception.
Furthermore, the fact that neural responses were related
to infants’ ability to produce the actively learned, but not
observationally learned, action demonstrates specific
effects on neural functioning of learning particular
actions. This is the first study to teach infants novel motor
actions and find a relation between each infant’s ability
to produce that action at the end of training and activation
of their neural motor system when presented with the
sensory consequence of that particular action. Finally,
the measure of motor activation to audio presentation
of action effects ruled out any possible effects of visual
processing of the action, thus ensuring that the activation
was not a function of visual processing.
The discrepancy between our findings and those that
suggest benefits from observational experience raise an
important question: How can we move beyond initial
motor experience to learn more broadly about actions
and their effects in the environment? Infancy provides a
unique window through which to look at the differential
roles of motor and observational experience because of
infants’ limited repertoire of motor actions. Behaviorally,
we saw no difference in the number of infants who could
perform the actively versus observationally learned actions
at the end of training. Importantly, there were no demon-
strable benefits of learning from observation either on a
group level or when infants were split based on whether
they could perform the observationally learned action. Be-
cause action performance was measured at the end of the
EEG session, it is an open question whether infants who
could perform the observationally learned action would
have shown a similar response to the sounds associated
with that action (as those associated with the actively
learned action) if they had had the chance to perform
the action before the post-training EEG session. The pre-
cise nature of the motor representation created for each
of these actions through training and how this relates to
motor activity in the brain should be examined further
in future research.
In this study, infants had a week’s worth of active and
observational training with new, two-step actions. In
natural contexts, longer-term learning of motor actions
likely serves as a base for and contributes to infants’ sub-
sequent observational learning (Gerson, 2014; Woodward
& Gerson, 2014). In this way, later in development, similar
motor activity is likely to be seen for observed actions
within and outside one’s motor repertoire, as long as
the person can achieve the goal of the action (in some
way) using movements already within his or her motor
system (see Woodward & Gerson, 2014; Aziz-Zadeh,
Sheng, Liew, & Damsio, 2012).
Southgate has presented a similar hypothesis to recon-
cile controversial evidence of motor activation for actions
within and outside infants’ motor repertoire (Southgate,
2013). In the Begus and Southgate (2013) experiment,
the authors found no indication of a difference in infants’
motor activation in response to observing claw actions
and hand actions on an object. Similar activation for claw
and hand actions would be expected if infants were able
to recognize the path of the claw and relate this to an
action they could use to achieve this goal (reaching with
a hand). Reaching with the hand is an action that is
repeatedly practiced by 9-month-olds in their everyday
life and would thus easily be brought forward as an alter-
native action. It is possible that increased experience with
a variety of simple actions leads to motor activation to the
observation of a broader range of actions that can achieve
similar goals through the combination or substitution of
the simple actions (Buccino & Riggio, 2006). After having
gained motor experience with a particular action (e.g.,
shaking), an infant can potentially map this motor rep-
resentation, as in Paulus et al., to novel effects and goals
(e.g., a new sound) that become associated with the
motor action through observational, rather than active,
experience (Paulus et al., 2013; cf. de Klerk, Johnson,
Heyes, & Southgate, 2014).
Whether the observed effect was a function of a causal
link between the motor action and the sound is an open
question. That is, it is unknown whether the motor
action necessarily needed to result in the sound in order
for the association between the sound and the motor
system to be formed. For example, if infants were to
activate their own motor systems via play with another
object while they viewed their parents perform the
(motorically unfamiliar) action that resulted in the sound,
their motor system might then later respond to the
sound via association with the action the infant had
produced (that was unrelated to the sound except in
“coincidental” timing). This possibility would be consis-
tent with the theoretical proposal put forth by Paulus and
colleagues (2008) and is a question for future research. The
current findings are consistent with the unique behavioral
effects of active relative to observational experience early
in development (Gerson & Woodward, 2014a; Hunnius
& Bekkering, 2014; Sommerville et al., 2008). Whether
and how this change in motor activity is related to the
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change in perception of the goal of the observed action is
an open question. To date, as far as we are aware, no
studies have simultaneously measured individual dif-
ferences in motor activation and perception of the effect
of an action. Instead, similar relations between expertise
and behavioral measures and expertise and motor acti-
vation have been hypothesized to support links between
the behavioral and neural measures (e.g., Marshall &
Meltzoff, 2014; Woodward & Gerson, 2014). Examining
this relation more directly is important for uncovering the
true nature of the link between motor activity and action
understanding.
Reprint requests should be sent to SarahA.Gerson,Montessorilaan
3, 6522CC Nijmegen, The Netherlands, or via e-mail: s.gerson@
donders.ru.nl.
UNCITED REFERENCE
Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek,
2012
REFERENCES
Aglioti, S. M., Cesari, P., Romani, M., & Urgesi, C. (2008). Action
anticipation and motor resonance in elite basketball players.
Nature Neuroscience, 11, 1109–1116.
Aziz-Zadeh, L., Sheng, T., Liew, S. L., & Damsio, H. (2012).
Understanding otherness: The neural bases of action
comprehension and pain empathy in a congenital amputee.
Cerebral Cortex, 22, 811–819.
Bangert, M., Peschel, T., Schlaug, G., Rotte, M., Drescher, D.,
Hinrichs, H., et al. (2006). Shared networks for auditory and
motor processing in professional pianists: Evidence from
fMRI conjunction. Neuroimage, 30, 917–926.
Buccino, G., & Riggio, L. (2006). The role of the mirror neuron
system in motor learning. Kinesiology, 38, 5–15.
Calvo-Merino, B., Grèzes, J., Glaser, D. E., Passingham, R. E.,
& Haggard, P. (2006). Seeing or doing? Influence of visual
and motor familiarity in action observation. Current Biology,
16, 1905–1910.
Cannon, E. N., Woodward, A. L., Gredebäck, G., von Hofsten,
C., & Turek, C. (2012). Action production influences 12-month-
old infants’ attention to others’ actions. Developmental
Science, 15, 35–42.
Casile, A., & Giese, M. A. (2006). Nonvisual motor training
influences biological motion perception. Current Biology, 16,
69–74.
Cross, E. S., Hamilton, A. F. C., & Grafton, S. T. (2006). Building
a motor simulation de novo: Observation of dance by
dancers. Neuroimage, 31, 1257–1267.
Cross, E. S., Kraemer, D. J. M., Hamilton, A. F. C., Kelley, W. M.,
& Grafton, S. T. (2009). Sensitivity of the action observation
network to physical and observational learning. Cerebral
Cortex, 19, 315–326.
Cross, E. S., Liepelt, R., Hamilton, A. F., Parkinson, J., Ramsey,
R., Stadler, W., et al. (2012). Robotic movement preferentially
engages the action observation network. Human Brain
Mapping, 33, 2238–2254.
Cuevas, K., Cannon, E. N., Yoo, K., & Fox, N. A. (2014). The
infant EEG mu rhythm: Methodological considerations and
best practices. Developmental Review, 34, 26–43.
de Klerk, C. C. J. M., Johnson, M. H., Heyes, C. M., & Southgate,
V. (2014). Baby steps: Investigating the development of
perceptual-motor couplings in infancy. Developmental
Science, 1–11. doi:10.1111/desc.12226.
Elsner, B., & Hommel, B. (2001). Effect anticipation and action
control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 27, 229–240.
Gerson, S. A. (2014). Sharing and comparing: How comparing
shared goals broadens goal understanding in development.
Child Development Perspectives, 8, 24–29.
Gerson, S. A., & Woodward, A. L. (2014a). Learning from their
own actions: The unique effect of producing actions on
infants’ action understanding. Child Development, 85,
264–277.
Gerson, S. A., & Woodward, A. L. (2014b). The joint role of
trained, untrained, and observed actions at the origins of goal
recognition. Infant Behavior & Development, 37, 94–104.
Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (2014). Review article: What are
you doing? How active and observational experience shape
infants’ action understanding. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society B. Advance Access published April 28, 2014:
doi:10.1098/rstb.2013.0490.
Järveläinen, J., Schuermann, M., & Hari, R. (2004). Activation of
the human primary motor cortex during observation of tool
use. Neuroimage, 23, 187–192.
Kim, Y., Seo, J. H., Song, H. J., Yoo, D. S., Lee, H. J., Lee, J., et al.
(2011). Neural correlates related to action observation in
expert archers. Behavioural Brain Research, 223, 342–347.
Kohler, E., Keysers, C., Umilta, M. A., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., &
Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hearing sounds, understanding actions:
Action representation in mirror neurons. Science, 297,
846–848.
Lloyd-Fox, S., Wu, R., Richards, J. E., Elwell, C. E., & Johnson,
M. H. (2013). Cortical activation to action perception is
associated with action production abilities in young infants.
Cerebral Cortex. Advance Access published August 23, 2013:
doi:10.1093/cercor/bht207.
Marshall, P. J., Bar-Haim, Y., & Fox, N. A. (2002). Development
of the EEG from 5 months to 4 years of age. Clinical
Neurophysiology, 113, 1199–1208.
Marshall, P. J., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2011). Neural mirroring
systems: Exploring the EEG mu rhythm in human infancy.
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 1, 110–123.
Marshall, P. J., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2014). Neural mirroring
mechanisms and imitation in human infants. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B. Advance access
published April 28, 2014: doi:10.1098/rtsb.2013.0620.
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (2013). Neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying social learning in infancy: Infants’
neural processing of the effects of others’ actions. Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8, 774–779.
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., van Elk, M., & Bekkering, H. (2012).
How learning to shake a rattle affects 8-month-old infants’
perception of the rattle’s sound: Electrophysiological
evidence for action-effect binding in infancy. Developmental
Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 90–96.
Pfurtscheller, G. (2003). Induced oscillations in the alpha band:
Functional meaning. Epilepsia, 44, 2–8.
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9, 129–154.
Quandt, L. C., Marshall, P. J., Bouquet, C. A., Young, T., &
Shipley, T. F. (2011). Experience with novel actions
modulates frontal alpha EEG desynchronization.
Neuroscience Letters, 499, 37–41.
Sommerville, J. A., Hildebrand, E. A., & Crane, C. C. (2008).
Experience matters: The impact of doing versus watching on
infants’ subsequent perception of tool-use events.
Developmental Psychology, 44, 1249–1256.
8 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume X, Number Y
Sommerville, J. A., Woodward, A. L., & Needham, A. (2005).
Action experience alters 3-month-old infants’ perception of
others’ actions. Cognition, 96, B1–B11.
Southgate, V. (2013). Does infant behaviour provide support for
the mirror neuron theory of action understanding?
Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1114–1121.
Southgate, V., & Begus, K. (2013). Motor activation during the
prediction of nonexecutable actions in infants. Psychological
Science, 24, 828–835.
van Elk, M., van Schie, H. T., Hunnius, S., Vesper, C., &
Bekkering, H. (2008). You’ll never crawl alone:
Neurophysiological evidence for experience-dependent
motor resonance in infancy. Neuroimage, 43,
808–814.
Vanderwert, R. E., Fox, N. A., & Ferrari, P. F. (2013). The mirror
mechanism and mu rhythm in social development.
Neuroscience Letters, 540, 15–20.
Woodward, A. L., & Gerson, S. A. (2014). Review article:
Mirroring and the development of action understanding.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
Advance Access published April 28, 2014: doi:10.1098/
rstb.2013.0181.
Gerson, Bekkering, and Hunnius 9
